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Abstract
We study the consensus problem in a synchronous distributed system of n nodes under an adaptive adversary
that has a slightly outdated view of the system and can block all incoming and outgoing communication of a
constant fraction of the nodes in each round. Motivated by a result of Ben-Or and Bar-Joseph (1998), showing
that any consensus algorithm that is resilient against a linear number of crash faults requires Ω˜(
√
n) rounds in
an n-node network against an adaptive adversary, we consider a late adaptive adversary, who has full knowledge
of the network state at the beginning of the previous round and unlimited computational power, but is oblivious
to the current state of the nodes. Our main contributions are randomized distributed algorithms that achieve con-
sensus with high probability among all except a small constant fraction of the nodes (i.e., “almost-everywhere”)
against a late adaptive adversary who can block up to ǫn nodes in each round, for a small constant ǫ > 0. Our
first protocol achieves binary almost-everywhere consensus and also guarantees a decision on the majority input
value, thus ensuring plurality consensus. We also present an algorithm that achieves the same time complexity for
multi-value consensus. Both of our algorithms succeed in O(log n) rounds with high probability, thus showing
an exponential gap to the Ω˜(
√
n) lower bound of Ben-Or and Bar-Joseph for strongly adaptive crash-failure ad-
versaries, which can be strengthened toΩ(n) when allowing the adversary to block nodes instead of permanently
crashing them. Our algorithms are scalable to large systems as each node contacts only an (amortized) constant
number of peers in each communication round. We show that our algorithms are optimal up to constant (resp.
sub-logarithmic) factors by proving that every almost-everywhere consensus protocol takes Ω(log
d
n) rounds in
the worst case, where d is an upper bound on the number of communication requests initiated per node in each
round. We complement our theoretical results with an experimental evaluation of the binary almost-everywhere
consensus protocol revealing a short convergence time even against an adversary blocking a large fraction of
nodes.
1 Introduction
Reaching consensus among the members of a distributed system is a fundamental ingredient for building a reli-
able distributed system out of unreliable parts (c.f., [32, 8]), with applications ranging from synchronization of
processes to distributed commit in databases.
Given that several impossibility results in asynchronous systems [24] and pessimistic lower bounds [20, 23] for
synchronous systems have been discovered for deterministic algorithms when nodes can be subjected to failures,
much of the recent work on the consensus problem focuses on using randomization to defeat the adversary (see [5]
for a comprehensive overview). Early randomized consensus algorithms include the work of Ben-Or [16], which
achieves consensus even in the asynchronous setting, where nodes perform steps at different speeds and messages
can exhibit delays. For the more severe case of Byzantine failures, where some nodes are directly controlled by
an adversary and hence deviate from the protocol, Rabin [38] showed that it is possible to achieve agreement
in a constant number of rounds in expectation when nodes have access to a shared common coin. The recent
work of [28], which assumes private communication channels between non-corrupted nodes, and [35] achieved a
significant reduction of the required message complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement protocols.
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(DFG) within the Collaborative Research Center “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901).
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Since all of the classic agreement protocols mentioned above require all-to-all communication and hence do
not scale well to large systems, one direction of research is to study the consensus problems in systems where the
nodes are interconnected by a sparse communication network. Considering that the adversary can isolate (small)
regions of a sparse network, achieving agreement among all nodes is impossible without strong guarantees on
the network’s connectivity [23]. However, for many practical applications such as achieving eventual consistency
in a peer-to-peer network (e.g., [36]), it is sufficient if a common decision is reached “almost everywhere”, i.e.,
among all but a small fraction of nodes. The almost-everywhere consensus problem was first introduced in [22]
(called almost-everywhere agreement) as a way to circumvent the classical impossibility results for consensus and
Byzantine agreement in sparse communication networks and has been studied under various failure models, such
as strongly adaptive and oblivious adversaries. More specifically, [22] provided an almost-everywhere agreement
algorithm that can tolerate O(n/ logn) Byzantine faults in a sparse network. Later, [43] improved over these
results by presenting a protocol that tolerates a linear number of failures. However, both of these protocols require
nodes to use a polynomial number of bits of communication. More recently, almost-everywhere consensus with
Byzantine nodes was studied in the context of bounded-degree peer-to-peer networks in the work of [29]. We
point out that [22, 43, 29] require nodes to be equipped with a priori knowledge about the network topology that
needs to be hard-coded into the distributed algorithm.
Other works consider almost-everywhere consensus in dynamically changing expander network topologies [9,
10] where the nodes can be subjected to churn over time. More specifically, [9] provide an algorithm using
logarithmic-size messages in the presence of O˜(
√
n)1 (obliviously-controlled) churn and Byzantine nodes, while
an extension of the algorithm can tolerate a strongly adaptive adversary albeit at the cost of requiring polynomial
message sizes. When there are no Byzantine nodes, [10] show that it is possible to tolerate even O(n)-churn
when the adversary is oblivious. However, none of these algorithms work against a late adversary (defined in
Section 1.4) who is adaptive and can fail a constant fraction of nodes.
1.1 Our Main Results
In this work, we consider the almost-everywhere consensus problem under a “late” adaptive adversary who has a
slightly outdated view of the entire system when deciding its next move. Studying late adversaries is reasonable
as it is unrealistic to assume that an adversary can make instantaneous decisions based on the global system
state, and our results demonstrate that it already makes a huge difference if the adversary is just late by a single
communication round.
We present new distributed algorithms for almost-everywhere consensus in a system of n synchronous, com-
pletely interconnected nodes that can withstand attacks on a constant fraction of the nodes in each round by a late
adversary who has full knowledge of the system state at the start of the previous round. In our protocols, every
node sends and receives at most O(log n) messages per round with high probability2. In particular we present
the following results under a late adaptive adversary that can block the communication of up to ǫn nodes in each
round, for a constant ǫ > 0:
(1) In Section 2, we provide an O(log n)-rounds algorithm that achieves almost-everywhere binary consensus
with high probability, where each node contacts O(1) other nodes per round. Moreover, the algorithm
achieves plurality consensus (w.h.p.).
(2) In Section 3, we present an O(log n)-rounds algorithm that solves almost-everywhere multi-value consen-
sus (w.h.p.). (Instead of the plurality guarantee, this algorithm satisfies the classical validity condition of
consensus; see Section 1.4.)
(3) In Section 4 we show a lower bound on the time complexity of any algorithm that achieves almost-everywhere
agreement with high probability assuming that each node can communicate with at most d nodes (chosen by
the algorithm and not by the adversary), requires Ω(logd n) rounds in the worst case. This implies that our
algorithm for binary consensus (cf. Section 2) is asymptotically optimal, whereas the multi-value algorithm
(cf. Section 3) is optimal up to sub-logarithmic factors, due to requiring d = Θ(logn).
(4) In Section 5 we deal with another lower bound: Note that the work of [12] shows that if a strongly adaptive
adversary who observes the current system state including the output of the random coinflips can fail up to t
of the n nodes in each round, then with high probability the adversary can force any consensus algorithm to
1The notation O˜(.) hides a polylogarithmic factor.
2We say an event E holds with high probability (w.h.p.) if Pr[E] ≥ 1− n−Ω(1).
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run forΩ(t/
√
n logn) rounds. This result holds even without restricting the communication of the nodes. In
fact, when considering a strongly adaptive adversary who can block a set of nodes, instead of permanently
crashing them, it is possible to show that Ω(n) rounds are necessary, which we elaborate on in Theorem 6.
(5) Finally, in Section 6 we present an experimental evaluation of the algorithm from Section 2 with differ-
ent parameters, suggesting a good practical performance of at most 2 log(n) rounds convergence time (on
average) of that algorithm and variants of it, even against an adversary who can block a large number of
nodes.
1.2 Technical Contribution
The main challenge that we have to overcome is the fact that the adversary has an almost up-to-date knowledge of
the state of the system. The key ingredient in our approach in handling a linear number of adversarial attacks is to
limit the extent to which the previous state of a node influences the computations of the algorithms.
For the binary consensus problem, at first glance the median rule presented in [19] seems to be a good candidate
to handle a late adversary. It uses a simple “pull” strategy in which each node requests the values from 2 nodes
chosen uniformly and independently at random, and selects the median of these two values and its own value as
its new value. However, “pull” strategies, which inherently require two communication rounds to compute a new
value, do not work against a late adaptive adversary, as a late adversary can anticipate the values received at the
end of the response round by the end of the request round. This essentially makes the adversary as powerful as the
strongly adaptive one. Another problem is that the value of a node depends on its previous value. In fact, it can
be shown that the median rule fails w.h.p. against a late adversary that can just cause Ω(
√
n logn) faults. Thus,
we converted the median rule into a “push” strategy, in which each node spreads its value in every communication
round to other nodes selected uniformly at random, and picks the majority of a random subset of received values
for its new value. When using such a procedure, however, the probabilities of the nodes to receive certain values
are no longer independent from each other. This requires a much more involved analysis, as we can no longer rely
on standard Chernoff bounds and the central limit theorem for showing a drift towards one value and need to use
the Paley-Zygmund inequality instead. Also, it can happen that nodes do not receive enough values to compute
a new value. In that case, we need an additional undecided state for the nodes to ensure independency from the
past node state, which has the effect that the number of nodes with a value may vary from round to round. This, in
turn, causes the support of the dominating value to no longer increase in absolute terms but rather only relatively
to the number of nodes that are not in an undecided state.
While the algorithm for binary almost-everywhere consensus (Section 2) solely bases its computations on the
values received from other nodes, in our algorithm for handling multi-value inputs (Section 3) a node does keep its
value unless it is blocked or learns about a larger value. Hence, eventually a consensus is reached on the maximum
value in the system. However, as the events of nodes joining the set that is informed about the maximum value are
not independent, we use the method of bounded differences and Azuma’s Inequality that a consensus is reached
even under a late adversary that can block a constant fraction of the nodes.
1.3 Other Related Work
As mentioned above, our algorithm for binary consensus is inspired by [19] which considers almost-stable con-
sensus under an adversary that may adaptively change the values of up to
√
n nodes after each round. The authors
derive an O(log n+ log k log log n) runtime bound w.h.p. for an arbitrary number of distinct initial values k and
O(log n) if k = 2. The latter bound is tight (even without an adversary) as we show in this work. To achieve their
results, the authors use the median rule. In the binary case this is equivalent to taking the majority of the received
values, which resembles the 3-majority rule. [14] study the 3-majority rule under an o(
√
n)-adaptive adversary,
showing that it converges in time polynomial in k and n w.h.p.
Our algorithm in Section 2 guarantees a decision on the majority input value (if any), which was studied
in non-adversarial settings by [15]. They present an algorithm with runtime Θ(k logn) w.h.p. for k being the
number of distinct initial values, which they prove to be tight for a wide range of values of k and the initial bias.
For certain values of k, the runtime of this algorithm is outperformed by [13] in which each node may contact one
neighbor at random in each round. The authors of the latter paper consider what they call the Undecided-State
Dynamics (originally introduced in [4] as Third-State dynamics), which makes use of an additional “undecided”
value different from all input values. This idea has also been used in [17] and [25] to solve plurality consensus
with small memory overhead and an exponential improvement on the runtime compared to [15]. In contrast to
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these works that do not consider adversaries, our algorithms, which also use undecided values, do so to prevent
the adversary from influencing the distribution of values by releasing previously blocked nodes. Note that all
consensus protocols mentioned thus far use a “pull” strategy, under which a late adversary is as powerful as a
fully adaptive one (as was argued in Section 1.2). Thus none of the analyses of these protocols could be trivially
adapted to achieve a consensus under a constant fraction of adversarial nodes in o˜(
√
n) rounds .
The idea of considering a late adversary who knows a previous state of the system has only been studied in a
few papers so far (e.g., [11, 2, 3, 21, 30]). As one of the first attempts, [11] studies how to make an information
system resilient against a blocking adversary that has knowledge of the system up to some point in time. In [2]
and [3], an adversary is called τ -oblivious if it knows the randomness of the nodes up to round r − τ to make a
decision for round r, in which the special case of a 0-oblivious adversary is called a strongly adaptive adversary.
The authors of [21] consider a so-called t-late adversary that bases its decision in round r on knowledge of the
complete state of nodes in round r − t and use this concept to maintain connectivity under an O(log logn)-late
adversary who may cause churn and block nodes. [30] introduces the notion of a c-round-delayed adversary which
resembles a c-oblivious adversary in the notation of [2].
A failure model related to the blocking adversary is the crash-recovery model considered for asynchronous
consensus in [1]. We point out that, in contrast to our model, in [1] nodes lose their entire state upon recovery and
can only recover state that was written to a stable storage.
[26] presents a protocol that achieves consensus against an oblivious adversary requiring only O(n) message
complexity, which is clearly optimal. While the overall communication of their algorithm is small, it requires
an asymmetric communication load, as some nodes need to send Ω(
√
n) messages. Other work that considers
consensus in models with restricted communication includes [37], who studies agreement in the radio network
model of wireless communication.
1.4 Computing Model and Problem Definition
We consider a system of n anonymous, completely interconnected nodes that operate in synchronous rounds. In
each round, every node first receives all messages from the previous round (that are not blocked by the adversary),
then does some arbitrary finite internal computation, and then sends off messages to other nodes.
Adversarial Model. Due to the lower bound results of [12, 9] discussed in Section 1.1, achieving agreement in
logarithmic time is out of reach against a strongly adaptive adversary who can block a linear number of nodes
per round, even when the amount of communication that a node can perform in each round is unrestricted. This
motivates us to consider a late ǫ-bounded adaptive adversary, who, at the start of each round t ≥ 2, can observe
the state of the entire system at the beginning of round t− 1. Based on that state, the adversary can block any set
Bt of ≤ ǫn nodes, with the effect that none of these nodes can receive or send messages in that round. We point
out that, in the very first round, the adversary knows the initial state of the system. However, it does not know the
coin flips performed by nodes in this round. Moreover, we assume that nodes know if they are currently blocked.
Notice that the adversary is still adaptive in the sense that it can tailor its next attack on the previously observed
network state.
Definition 1. Let γ < 12 be a positive constant. We assume that each node u starts with an input value chosen by
the adversary from a domain of size polynomial in n and, eventually, u irrevocably decides on a value. We say that
an algorithm solves almost-everywhere agreement in t rounds with high probability and loss γn, if the algorithm
terminates in t rounds and the following properties hold w.h.p.:
(Almost-Everywhere Agreement) All except at most γn nodes decide on the same value.
(Validity) If all nodes start with the same input value x, then x is the only possible decision.
In addition to the classic validity definition above, we are also interested in a stronger validity condition:
(Plurality) If an almost-everywhere agreement algorithm A guarantees the stronger validity condition that stipu-
lates x as the only possible decision if the number of nodes having input x exceeds the number of nodes having
input y for every other possible value y 6= x by at least s ≥ γn. In this case, we say that A solves almost-
everywhere plurality consensus with initial bias s.
2 Binary Consensus
In this section, we assume that each node u has a local variable xu that can hold the values 0, 1, or ⊥ (i.e.
“undefined”). A node u is called undefined if xu = ⊥ and otherwise defined. Consider the following protocol for
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some integers k, ℓ > 0, where k ≥ ℓ and ℓ odd:
(k, ℓ)-majority algorithm. In each round, every node u acts according to the following rules:
• reset rule: If u has received less than ℓ values from the previous round, or it is blocked, then it sets xu := ⊥
and skips the rest of this round.
• update rule: Otherwise, u picks ℓ of the received values uniformly at random, sets xu to the majority value
of the ℓ values, and sends out xu to k nodes chosen independently and uniformly at random.
We assume here that if the adversary blocks u, then u notices it. (In practice, it may simply not receive enough
values, which would also have the effect in our protocol that xu is set to ⊥.) In the rest of this section we show:
Theorem 1. For any initial assignment of values to the nodes with no undefined node and any ǫ ≤ 1/16,O(log n)
rounds of the (6, 3)-majority rule suffice to ensure that all except a constant fraction of nodes hold the same value
(w.h.p) against a late ǫ-bounded blocking adversary.
On a high-level view, the proof works as follows: Let Xt be the number of nodes with value 0 at the end of
round t, let Yt be the number of nodes with value 1 at the end of round t, and let nt := Xt + Yt be the number
of defined nodes at the end of round t. First of all, observe that there will be at least 3n/4 defined nodes at the
end of round 1 since the adversary can block at most n/16many nodes. In Lemma 2 we show that this holds after
every round. In the remaining part, we assume without loss of generality that Xt ≤ Yt and define the imbalance
at round t by ∆t = (Yt − Xt)/2 (which is non-negative by our assumption). Based on the imbalance ∆t we
distinguish between three cases. First, we show that if the imbalance∆t exceeds nt/4, i.e., there is a value that at
least 3/4 of the defined nodes have, then this value will be spread to almost every node withinO(log logn) rounds
w.h.p. Second, we show that if c
√
nt lnnt ≤ ∆t < nt/4 for a sufficiently large constant c, the number of nodes
having the dominating value will grow within O(log n) rounds w.h.p. such that it is held by at least 3/4 of all
defined nodes. While the overall structure of the proof in the first two cases follows [19], here we face additional
complications due to dependencies among the random variables. Note that these two cases directly imply that the
(k, ℓ)-majority algorithm solves the plurality consensus problem for initial bias s ≥√n(1 + ǫ) log(n(1 + ǫ)). In
the third case, we show that for very low imbalances, with high probability one of the two values will take over a
sufficiently large number of the nodes such that the requirements of the second case are fulfilled.
To begin with the formal analysis, we introduce some results from probability theory.
Definition 2. Let X1, . . . , Xn be binary random variables. We say that X1, . . . , Xn are s-wise independently
upper bounded by p1, . . . , pn if for any subset S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} with |S| ≤ s and any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ S it
holds that Pr[Xi = 1 |
∧
j∈S Xj = 1] ≤ pi.
For these random variables the following variant of the Chernoff bounds can be shown:
Lemma 1. LetX1, . . . , Xn be binary random variables that are k-wise independently upper bounded by p1, . . . , pn
andX =
∑n
i=1Xi. Also, let µ =
∑n
i=1 pi. Then it holds for all δ > 0 that
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ
≤ e−δ2µ/(2(1+δ/3)) ≤ e−min{δ2,δ}µ/3
as long as k ≥ (1 + δ)µ.
This lemma directly follows from Theorem 3.52 in [41] which itself is based on results in [42].
Certainly, there will be at least 3n/4 defined nodes at the end of round 1 since the adversary can block at most
n/16 many nodes. For all subsequent rounds it holds:
Lemma 2. For any assignment of values to the nodes with at least 3n/4 defined nodes at the end of round t, there
will also be at least 3n/4 defined nodes at the end of round t+ 1 w.h.p.
Proof. Recall that nt is the number of defined nodes at the end of round t. For any non-blocked node u in round
t+ 1 it holds that Pr[u receives no value] = (1− 1/n)6nt ≤ e−6nt/n and
Pr[u receives one value] =
(
6nt
1
)
(1/n) · (1− 1/n)6nt−1 ≤ 6nt
n
· e−(6nt−1)/n,
Pr[u receives two values] =
(
6nt
2
)
(1/n)2 · (1− 1/n)6nt−2 ≤ 1
2
(
6nt
n
)2
· e−(6nt−2)/n.
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Hence,
Pr[u receives ≤ 2 values] ≤
(
1 +
6nt
n
+
1
2
(
6nt
n
)2)
· e−(6nt−2)/n.
If nt ≥ 3n/4 then Pr[u receives ≤ 2 values] ≤ 2/11 if n is large enough. Since the adversary can block at
most n/16 nodes, we get E[number of undefined nodes] ≤ (2/11)(1− 1/16)n+ n/16 ≤ n/4.4. Unfortunately,
the probabilities of the nodes to be undefined are not independent, but they are n/4-wise independently upper
bounded by 2/11 as shown by the following claim.
Claim 1. For any subset S of non-blocked nodes with |S| ≤ n/4 and any non-blocked node u 6∈ S it holds that
Pr[u undefined | all nodes in S undefined] ≤ 2/11.
Proof. Let s = |S|. Suppose that exactly k of the 6nt values have been sent to nodes in S. Certainly, if all nodes
in S are undefined, then k ≤ 2s. It is easy to check that if n is sufficiently large, then for any nt ≥ 3n/4 and
any k ≤ 2s, (6nt − k)/(n − s) ≥ 6nt/n. Moreover, the functions e−x, x · e−x and x2 · e−x are monotonically
decreasing for any x ≥ 2. Hence, given that all nodes in S are undefined, we get:
Pr[u receives no value]
= (1 − 1/(n− s))6nt−k ≤ e−(6nt−k)/(n−s) ≤ e−6nt/n
Pr[u receives one value]
=
(
6nt − k
1
)
(1/(n− s)) · (1− 1/(n− s))6nt−k−1
≤ 6nt − k
n− s · e
−(6nt−k−1)/(n−s) ≤ 6nt
n
· e−6nt/n · e1/(n−s)
Pr[u receives two values]
=
(
6nt − k
2
)
(1/(n− s))2 · (1− 1/(n− s))6nt−k−2
≤ 1
2
(
6nt − k
n− s
)2
· e−(6nt−k−2)/(n−s)
≤ 1
2
(
6nt
n
)2
· e−6nt/n · e2/(n−s)
Hence, given that all nodes in S are undefined,
Pr[u receives≤ 2 values]
≤
(
1 +
6nt
n
+
1
2
(
6nt
n
)2)
· e−6nt/n · e2/(n−s) ≤ 2/11
as long as |S| ≤ n/4 and n is sufficiently large.
Therefore, we can make use of the Chernoff bounds in Lemma 1 to show that the number of undefined nodes
is at most n/4 w.h.p. This completes the proof of the lemma.
In the remaining part of the analysis, we carry out the aforementioned case distinction based on the value of
∆t.
Case 1: ∆t ≥ nt/4
Lemma 3. If there is a round t0 with ∆t0 ≥ nt0/4, then there is a round t1 = t0 + O(log logn) at which we
reach an almost-everywhere consensus, w.h.p.
Proof. If∆t ≥ nt/4 thenXt ≤ nt/4. Since (x− k)/(y − k) ≤ x/y for any k ≥ 0 and any x, y > k with y ≥ x,
it holds for round t+ 1 that
Pr[xu = 0 | u defined] =
(
3
2
)
6Xt
6nt
· 6Xt − 1
6nt − 1 ·
6Yt
6nt − 2 +
6Xt
6nt
· 6Xt − 1
6nt − 1 ·
6Xt − 2
6nt − 2
≤
(
3
2
)
p2t ·
6Yt
6nt − 2 + p
3
t
6
Moreover,
6Yt
6nt − 2 = (1 +O(1/nt))
nt −Xt
nt
= (1 +O(1/nt))(1 − pt)
Hence,
Pr[xu = 0 | u defined] ≤ 3p2t (1− pt) · (1 +O(1/nt)) + p3t ≤ 3p2t
as long as Xt = Ω(logn) and n is sufficiently large, which implies that
E[Xt+1 | Xt, nt, nt+1] ≤ 3p2tnt+1
For any defined node v let the binary random variable Zv be 1 if and only if xv = 0, and let Nt denote the set of
all defined nodes. ThenXt+1 can be represented as
Xt+1 =
∑
v∈Nt
Zv
Note that the Zv’s are not independent. However, the following claim can be shown.
Claim 2. For any subset S of defined nodes with |S| ≤ nt/4 and any defined node u 6∈ S it holds for round t+ 1
that
Pr[xu = 0 |
∧
v∈S
xv = 0] ≤ 3.5p2t
Proof. Consider any event where xv is set to 0 for all v ∈ S and the nodes in S inspected k 0s and ℓ 1s for their
decisions. Let s = |S|. Under the assumption that u is defined,
Pr[xu is set to 0] =
(
3
2
)
6Xt − k
6nt − 3s ·
6Xt − k − 1
6nt − 3s− 1 ·
6Yt − ℓ
6nt − 3s− 2 +
6Xt − k
6nt − 3s ·
6Xt − k − 1
6nt − 3s− 1 ·
6Xt − k − 2
6nt − 3s− 2
≤
(
3
2
)
p2t ·
6Yt − ℓ
6nt − 3s− 2 + p
3
t
In order to show the last inequality, we first note that k + ℓ = 3s and k ≥ 2ℓ since otherwise there must be a
node v ∈ S that saw at least two 1s, which cannot happen. Hence, k ≥ 2s. Because Xt ≤ nt/4, this implies that
(6Xt − k − i)/(6nt − 3s− i) ≥ (6Xt − i)/(6nt − i) for any i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. On the other hand, since s ≤ nt/4,
6Yt − ℓ
6nt − 3s− 2 ≤ 1.15
6Yt
6nt − 2 = (1.15 +O(1/nt))
6Yt
6nt
Hence,
Pr[xu is set to 0] ≤
(
3
2
)
p2t · (1.15 +O(1/nt))(1 − pt) + p3t ≤ 3.5p2t
if nt is large enough, which proves the claim.
Therefore, we can make use of the Chernoff bounds in Lemma 1 to show thatXt+1 ≤ 4p2tnt+1 w.h.p., as long
as E[Xt+1] = Ω(log n). We know that pt0 ≤ 1/4. Hence, for any i ≥ 0 with E[Xt0+i] = Ω(logn), pt0+i ≤
(2pt0)
2i , which means after O(log logn) rounds we are down to just Xt = O(log n). Thus, we have reached an
almost-everywhere consensus, and this will be preserved as our arguments imply that also in polynomially many
subsequent rounds,Xt = O(log n) w.h.p.
Case 2: c
√
nt lnnt ≤ ∆t < nt/4 for a sufficiently large constant c
Lemma 4. If there is a round t0 with c
√
nt0 lnnt0 ≤ ∆t0 ≤ nt0/4 for a sufficiently large constant c, then there
is a round t1 = t0 +O(log n) with ∆t1 ≥ nt/4 w.h.p.
7
Proof. Suppose that∆t0 ≥ c
√
nt0 lognt0 . Let δt = ∆t/nt. Then it holds thatXt = nt/2−∆t = nt(1/2− δt).
Similar to the previous case, for any defined node u,
Pr[xu = 0] =
(
3
2
)
6Xt
6nt
· 6Xt − 1
6nt − 1 ·
6Yt
6nt − 2 +
6Xt
6nt
· 6Xt − 1
6nt − 1 ·
6Xt − 2
6nt − 2
≤
(
3
2
)
(1/2− δt)2 · 6Yt
6nt − 2 + (1/2− δt)
3
= 3(1/2− δt)2(1/2 + δt) · (1 +O(1/nt)) + (1/2− δt)3
= 1/2− (3/2)δt + 2δ3t +O(1/nt)
Since c
√
(lnnt)/nt ≤ δt ≤ 1/4, it follows that
E[Xt+1 | Xt, nt, nt+1] ≤ (1/2− (11/8)δt)nt+1
Like in the case of∆t ≥ nt/4,Xt+1 can be represented as
Xt+1 =
∑
v∈Nt
Zv
for some binary random variablesZv that, unfortunately, are not independent. However, the following claim holds:
Claim 3. For any subset S of defined nodes with |S| ≤ nt/2 and any defined node u 6∈ S it holds that
Pr[xu = 0 |
∧
v∈S
xv = 0] ≤ 1/2− (11/8)δt
Proof. Consider any event E(k, ℓ) where xv is set to 0 for all v ∈ S and the nodes in S inspected k Os and ℓ 1s
for their decisions. Let s = |S|. Recall that k + ℓ = 3s and k ≥ 2ℓ and therefore, k ≥ 2s. This means that the
ratio between the number of remaining 0s and the remaining 1s is lower for u than it was initially, so it should
lower the probability that xu = 0. In fact, it already follows from the proof of Claim 2 that the function
f(s) =
6Xt − k
6nt − 3s ·
6Xt − k − 1
6nt − 3s− 1 ·
6Xt − k − 2
6nt − 3s− 2
is monotonically decreasing for s ≥ 0 if k ≥ 2s. Via tedious calculations one can also show that the function
g(s) =
6Xt − k
6nt − 3s ·
6Xt − k − 1
6nt − 3s− 1 ·
6(nt −Xt)− (3s− k)
6nt − 3s− 2
is monotonically decreasing for s ≥ 0 if k ≥ 2s, which implies that we can upper bound Pr[xu = 0 |
∧
v∈S xv =
0] in the same way as for the isolated case Pr[xu = 0].
Hence, it follows from the Chernoff bounds thatXt+1 ≤ (1/2−(9/8)δt)nt+1 w.h.p. (by setting δ = 3δt/16 in
Lemma 1) as long as c
√
nt lnnt ≤ ∆t < nt/4, i.e., c
√
(lnnt)/nt ≤ δt ≤ 1/4. This implies that δt+1 ≥ (9/8)δt
w.h.p. Thus, there is a round t1 = t0 +O(log n) with δt1 ≥ 1/4, w.h.p., which completes the proof.
Case 3: |∆t| < c
√
nt lnnt
Up to this point we assumed that Xt ≤ Yt w.l.o.g. because once the difference between the number of 0s and 1s
is at least c
√
nt lnnt, the majority value will win w.h.p. However, if |∆t| < c
√
nt lnnt, it may not be clear any
more who will win. First, we show that with constant probability it just takes a constant number of rounds until
|∆t| ≥ c′√nt, and then we use that insight together with insights from Case 2 and a result about Markov chains
to argue that within O(log n) rounds, |∆t| ≥ c
√
nt lnnt w.h.p. Before that, we need two technical lemmas.
We say that a random variable Z stochastically dominates a random variable Z ′, and write Z  Z ′, if Pr[Z ≥
x] ≥ Pr[Z ′ ≥ x] for any x. Recall that∆t = (Yt −Xt)/2, whereXt is the number of 0s and Yt is the number of
1s. For simplicity we assume that nt is even so that∆t is an integer.
Lemma 5. For any two imbalances∆t and∆
′
t with ∆t ≥ ∆′t ≥ 0 it holds that∆t+1  ∆′t+1.
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Proof. We show stochastic domination for any two imbalances ∆t and ∆
′
t = ∆t − 1. The rest follows by
induction. Let z = n/2 −∆′t. Without loss of generality, we assume that nodes 1 to z − 1 have value 0 in both
∆t and∆
′
t, and nodes z + 1, . . . , n have value 1 in both∆t and∆
′
t. Node z has value 1 in∆t and value 0 in∆
′
t.
Let Ω be the space of all possible outcomes of the random experiment of sending 6 copies of each defined
value to nodes chosen independently and uniformly at random and making decisions at those nodes that receive
more than 3 values which of these 3 to pick. Consider any such outcome w ∈ Ω.
Any node that sets its value to 0 in w assuming∆ also sets its value to 0 in w assuming∆′. On the other hand,
any node that sets its value to 1 in w assuming∆′ also sets its value to 1 in w assuming∆. SoXt+1|∆ dominates
Xt+1|∆′ and Yt+1|∆′ dominates Yt+1|∆. Hence, (Yt+1 − Xt+1)|∆ dominates (Yt+1 −Xt+1)|∆′ , which proves
the lemma.
The main lemma of this section is the following:
Lemma 6. For any |∆t| ≥ 0, Pr[|∆t+1| ≥
√
nt/16] ≥ α for some constant α > 0, provided nt is large enough.
To prove this lemma, we use the Paley-Zygmund inequality (Lemma 7) defined as follows:
Lemma 7 (Paley-Zygmund). If X ≥ 0 is a random variable with finite variance, then for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1,
Pr[X > ǫE[X ]] ≥ (1− ǫ)2E[X ]
2
E[X2]
We now prove Lemma 9:
Proof. We only need to prove the lemma for∆t = 0 because the general case follows from stochastic domination
(see Lemma 5).
Since for ∆t = 0 every defined node v in round t + 1 has the same probability of having xv = 0 or xv = 1,
E[∆t+1] = 0. For any defined node v in round t + 1 let the binary random variable Zv be 1 if and only if xv is
set to 0 in round t+ 1. In this case, givenNt+1,
∆t+1 =
1
2



nt+1 − ∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv

− ∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv

 = nt+1/2− ∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv
From the definition of the variance it follows that
V [∆t+1 | Nt+1] =
∑
v∈Nt+1
V [Zv] +
∑
v,w∈Nt+1,v 6=w
cov(Zv, Zw)
For any v ∈ Nt+1, V [Zv] = E[Z2v ]− E[Zv]2. Furthermore,E[Zv] = Pr[Zv = 1] = 1/2 and E[Z2v ] = Pr[Zv =
1] = 1/2 as well. Hence, V [Zv] = 1/2− 1/4 = 1/4. Moreover,
cov(Zv, Zw) = E[(Zv − E[Zv])(Zw − E[Zw])] = E[Zv · Zw]− E[Zv] ·E[Zw]
Certainly,
E[Zv · Zw] = Pr[Zv = Zw = 1] = Pr[Zv = 1] · Pr[Zw = 1 | Zv = 1] = 1
2
Pr[Zw = 1 | Zv = 1]
but obtaining a good estimate of Pr[Zw = 1 | Zv = 1] is difficult, so we first note that
Pr[v sees (0, 0, 1)] =
1
8
+
1
48nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
and
Pr[v sees (0, 0, 0)] =
1
8
− 1
16nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
Next, we estimate Pr[Zw = 1] for the case that v sees (0, 0, 1) or (0, 0, 0). First of all,
Pr[Zw = 1 | v sees (0, 0, 1)] =
(
3
2
)
6Xt − 2
6nt − 3 ·
6Xt − 3
6nt − 4 ·
6Yt − 1
6nt − 5 +
6Xt − 2
6nt − 3 ·
6Xt − 3
6nt − 4 ·
6Xt − 4
6nt − 5
9
Furthermore, for Xt = Yt = nt/2, (6Xt − 2)/(6nt − 3) = (6Xt)/(6nt) − 1/(12nt)) ± O(1/n2t ), (6Xt −
3)/(6nt − 4) = (6Xt − 1)/(6nt − 1)− 1/(12nt))±O(1/n2t ), (6Xt − 4)/(6nt − 5) = (6Xt − 2)/(6nt − 2)−
1/(12nt))±O(1/n2t ), and (6Yt − 1)/(6nt − 5) = (6Yt)/(6nt − 2) + 1/(12nt))±O(1/n2t ). Thus,
Pr[Zw = 1 | v sees (0, 0, 1)]
=Pr[Zw = 1]−
(
3
2
)
·
(
2
(
1
2
)2(
− 1
12nt
)
+
(
1
2
)2
1
12nt
)
− 3 ·
(
1
2
)2
· 1
12nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
=
1
2
− 1
8nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
On the other hand,
Pr[Zw = 1 | v sees (0, 0, 0)] =
(
3
2
)
6Xt − 3
6nt − 3 ·
6Xt − 4
6nt − 4 ·
6Yt
6nt − 5 +
6Xt − 3
6nt − 3 ·
6Xt − 4
6nt − 4 ·
6Xt − 5
6nt − 5
and forXt = Yt = nt/2, (6Xt − 3)/(6nt − 3) = (6Xt)/(6nt)− 1/(4nt) ±O(1/n2t ), (6Xt − 4)/(6nt − 4) =
(6Xt− 1)/(6nt− 1)− 1/(4nt)±O(1/n2t ), (6Xt− 5)/(6nt− 5) = (6Xt− 2)/(6nt− 2)− 1/(4nt)±O(1/n2t ),
and (6Yt)/(6nt − 5) = (6Yt)/(6nt − 2) + 1/(4nt)±O(1/n2t ). Thus, in this case,
Pr[Zw = 1 | v sees (0, 0, 0)] = Pr[Zw = 1]−
(
3
2
)
· 1
4
· 1
4nt
− 3 · 1
4
· 1
4nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
=
1
2
− 3
8nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
Hence, altogether,
E[Zv · Zw] = 3 ·
(
1
8
+
1
48nt
)(
1
2
− 1
8nt
)
+
(
1
8
− 1
16nt
)(
1
2
− 3
8nt
)
± O
(
1
n2t
)
=
1
4
− 3
32nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
and therefore,
cov(Zv, Zw) = − 3
32nt
±O
(
1
n2t
)
Plugging this into the formula for the variance, and using the fact that w.h.p. nt ∈ [3n/4, n] and therefore,
nt+1/nt ∈ [3/4, 4/3], we get
V [∆t+1 | Nt+1] = nt+1
4
− 3nt+1(nt+1 − 1)
32nt
±O
(
n2t+1
n2t
)
≥ nt+1
8
±O(1)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of the variance that
V [∆t+1] = E[∆
2
t+1]− E[∆t+1]2
and since E[∆t+1] = 0,
E[|∆t+1|2] = E[∆2t+1] ≥
nt+1
8
±O(1)
To calculate E[|∆t+1|4], note that
E[|∆t+1|4] =E[(nt+1
2
−
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
4]
=
(nt+1
2
)4
− 4
(nt+1
2
)3 ∑
v∈Nt+1
E[Zv]
+ 6
(nt+1
2
)2
E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
2]
− 4 · nt+1
2
E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
3] + E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
4]
10
Furthermore,
∑
v∈Nt+1
E[Zv] =
nt+1
2
E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
2] =
∑
v∈Nt+1
E[Zv] +
∑
v,w∈Nt+1,v 6=w
E[Zv · Zw]
E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
3] =
∑
v∈Nt+1
E[Zv]
+
(
3
2
) ∑
v,w∈Nt+1,v 6=w
E[Zv · Zw]
+
∑
u,v,w∈Nt+1,u6=v 6=w
E[Zu · Zv · Zw]
E[(
∑
v∈Nt+1
Zv)
4] =
∑
v∈Nt+1
E[Zv]
+
((
4
3
)
+
4!
2! · 2! · 2
)
·
∑
v,w∈Nt+1,v 6=w
E[Zv · Zw]
+
(
4
2
) ∑
u,v,w∈Nt+1,u6=v 6=w
E[Zu · Zv · Zw]
+
∑
u,v,w,x∈Nt+1,u6=v 6=w 6=x
E[Zu · Zv · Zw · Zx]
Putting this together and using a CAS, one can show that the maximum of E[|∆t+1|4] is achieved for nt+1/nt =
4/3 and in this case it is upper bounded by:
E[|∆t+1|4] ≤ 1
12
nt+1
2 +
5
216
nt+1 +
77
5184
+
371
31104 · nt+1 +O
(
1
n2t+1
)
As an intuition whyE[|∆t+1|4] = O(n2t+1) holds, note that if theZv’s are independent, then one can make use
of the formulas for higher moments of binomial distributions (see, e.g., [27]) to show thatE[|∆t+1|4] = O(n2t+1).
In addition to that, as indicated by the negative covariance, seeing a majority of 0s (resp. 1s) in some nodes implies
seeing fewer 0s (resp. 1s) for subsequent nodes, so one expects higher moments in our case to be less than in the
independent case. In fact, in the independent case, E[|∆t+1|2] = nt+1/4.
Hence, it follows from the Payley-Zygmund inequality that
Pr[|∆t+1|2 ≥ nt+1
16
] ≥ α
for some constant α > 0, which completes the proof of the lemma.
Moreover, from the proof of Lemma 4 and the Chernoff bounds in Lemma 1 we get:
Lemma 8. For any δt = Ω(1/
√
nt), Pr[δt+1 ≥ (9/8)δt] ≥ 1− exp
(−Θ(δ2tnt+1)) .
Now we can finish Case 3.
Lemma 9. If at a round t0 we have |∆t0 | < c
√
nt0 lnnt0 for the value of c needed by Lemma 4, then there is a
round t1 = t0 +O(log n) with |∆t1 | ≥ c
√
nt lnnt w.h.p.
Proof. Lemma 6 implies that the expected number of steps until we are in the hypothesis of Lemma 8 is O(1).
That is, |∆t| = γ√nt for some constant γ > 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that∆t > 0, and considerΥt = ⌊δt√nt/γ⌊ and
let q = ⌊c√lnnt/γ⌋ denote the maximum value of Υt. To continue, we need the following technical result from
[19].
Claim 4. Let (Xt)
∞
t=1 be a Markov Chain with state space {0, . . . , q} that has the following properties:
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• there are constants c1 > 1 and c2 > 0, such that for any t ≥ 1, Pr[Xt+1 ≥ min{c1Xt, q}] ≥ 1− e−c2Xt ,
• Xt = 0⇒ Xt+1 ≥ 1 with probability c3 which is a constant greater than 0.
Let c4 > 0 be an arbitrary constant and T := min{t ≥ 1: Xt ≥ c4 log q}. Then for every constant c6 > 0 there
is a constant c5 = c5(c4, c6) > 0 such that
Pr[T ≤ c5 · log q + logc1(c4 log q)] ≥ 1− q−c6 .
By this claim, O(log q) rounds suffice to achieveΥt ≥ c4 log q, or∆t+τ−1 ≥ c√nt+τ−1 · c4 log q, w.h.p. for
any constant c4 > 0, which finishes the proof.
Deciding on a consensus value. Note that while the (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm converges to a common plurality
value within O(log n) rounds, the nodes cannot determine whether an almost-everywhere consensus has already
been reached. We address this by executing the deciding (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm in which each nodeu executes
both the reset rule and the update rule of the original (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm and, additionally, the following rule:
• decision rule: If there is some y ∈ {0, 1} so that for the past α lnn rounds, xu ∈ {y,⊥} and for at least
half of them, xu = y, then u outputs y.
Here, α > 0 is a constant determined in the proofs of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 10. For any initial assignment of values to the nodes with no defined node and any ǫ ≤ 1/16, there is
a constant β > 0 so that every node that is blocked in at most a fifth of β lnn rounds will output a value within
these rounds, w.h.p.
Proof. We know that there is a constant β′ > 0 so that the original (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm reaches an almost-
everywhere consensus on some value y ∈ {0, 1} in at most β′ lnn rounds, w.h.p. Consider a node u that is blocked
in at most a fifth of β lnn rounds, where β ≥ 5β′. Then u is blocked in at most a fourth of the last (β − β′) lnn
rounds, since otherwise it would be blocked too often over all of the β lnn rounds. Next, assume that β is large
enough so that the last (β − β′) lnn rounds can be cut into c intervals of α lnn rounds each. For at most 2c/3 of
these intervals u is blocked at least 1/3 of the rounds since otherwise it would again be blocked too often. Let S
be the set of the remaining c/3 intervals. Consider some fixed interval I ∈ S. Since u is blocked at most a third of
the rounds in I and for any round in which u is non-blocked, Pr[u is undefined] ≤ 2/11, it follows from standard
Chernoff bounds that there are at least half of the rounds in I where u is defined w.h.p. (if α > 0 and n are large
enough). Thus, any interval I ∈ S is a candidate where u may output a value. For any round t in such an I in
which u is defined, the probability that u sets its variable to the non-consensus value is at most
(
3
2
)(
γ logn
3n/4
)2
+
(
γ logn
3n/4
)3
≤
(
3γ logn
n
)2
Hence, the probability that u sets its variable to the non-consensus value in some round in I is at most
α lnn ·
(
3γ logn
n
)2
<
1
2n
if n is sufficiently large, and therefore, Pr[u does not output y at the end of I] ≤ 1/n. Thus, the probability that
there is no I ∈ S at which u outputs y at the end of I is at most n−c/3, which completes the proof.
Note that a 1/16-bounded adversary can cause at most 1/3 of the nodes to be blocked more than 1/5 of the
rounds, which implies that at least 2/3 of the nodes will produce an output w.h.p. Finally, we show that it cannot
happen that two nodes output different values, so nodes eventually decide such that almost-everywhere consensus
holds w.h.p.
Lemma 11. There is a constant α > 0 such that if a node u outputs a value y ∈ {0, 1} in the deciding (k, ℓ)-
majority algorithm, then no node ever outputs a value z 6= y w.h.p.
Proof. First, we show that if a node u outputs a value y ∈ {0, 1}, then there must have been a round t in the past
α lnn rounds with |∆t| ≥ nt/4. Suppose that there was no such round. Then for every round t of these α lnn
rounds there are at least nt/4 nodes v ∈ V with xv = 0 and at least nt/4 nodes v ∈ V with xv = 1. Let T be
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the set of the past α lnn rounds in which u was defined. We know that if u outputs a value then |T | ≥ (α/2) lnn.
For any round t ∈ T ,
Pr[xu = 0 | u is defined] ≥
(
3
2
)(
1
4
)2(
1− 1
4
)
±
(
1
nt
)
≥ 1
8
and the same lower bound also applies to Pr[xu = 1 | u is defined ]. Thus, for any z ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[xu 6= z for all t ∈ T ] ≤ (1 − 1/8)(α/2) lnn ≤ e−(α/16) lnn = n−α/16
This, however, means that if α > 0 is a sufficiently large constant, then w.h.p. u would not output a value. Hence,
if u outputs a value, there must have been a round t0 in the past α lnn rounds with |∆t0 | ≥ nt0/4, w.h.p.
Next we show that the value y output by u must be the majority value at round t0. This holds because from t0
there will always be at least nt/4 of the nodes with value y, w.h.p., so the probability that xu is never equal to y
in the past α lnn rounds is still polynomially small in n.
Suppose now that u is the first node that outputs a value y. Then there cannot be a node v that subsequently
outputs a different value for the same reasoning as for u since also for v there must have been at least nt/4 of the
nodes with value y in each of the past α lnn rounds, completing the proof.
Combining Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 with Theorem 1, and observing that Cases 1 and 2 imply the plurality
property we have shown the following result:
Theorem 2. The (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm together with the decision rule achieves binary almost-everywhere
consensus (w.h.p.) in O(log n) rounds, against a late adversary who can block up to ǫn nodes in each round, for
ǫ < 116 . Moreover, the decision value will satisfy the plurality property (w.h.p.).
3 Multi-Value Consensus
We now describe an algorithm for the case where nodes start out with arbitrary input values. While the algorithm
achieves the same runtime bound as the majority rule algorithm presented in Section 2, we point out that it does
not guarantee the plurality property, due to its use of a maximum-rule for spreading a common value.
We first give a high-level overview and present the detailed pseudocode in Algorithm 1. Initially, each node u
has a local variable xu that is set to an input value chosen by the adversary from a fixed domain of size poly(n).
We say that a node is active in the current round, if it initiates communication with other nodes and call it inactive
otherwise. In the first round, each node becomes active with probability Θ( lognn ) and every active node sends
its input value to a set of Θ(logn) nodes chosen uniformly at random. Only initially active nodes retain their
input value; all other nodes (including the ones that are blocked) reset their value to a default value ⊥, which is
considered to be the minimum value.
From this point onward, the algorithm performs Θ(logn) iterations of information spreading: We start an
iteration by instructing nodes that have received messages to mark themselves as active. Then, every active node
computes its new value as the maximum of the received values including its current value, sends its updated value
to 2 nodes v andw chosen uniformly at random. In the next iteration, v andw in turn become active and participate
in spreading their newly computed values. After Θ(logn) iterations, all nodes decide on their current value.
To understand why the first round requires active nodes to communicate with Θ(logn) nodes each, it is in-
structive to consider the “uniform” algorithm where active nodes always contact 2 peers. Since the adversary can
block up to ǫn nodes in each round, it has constant probability of blocking all nodes that currently hold the max-
imum value x∗, assuming it targets a randomly chosen subset of nodes during the first few rounds. If successful,
the adversary can slowdown the spreading of value x∗ among the nodes in the network. The end result of this
scenario is that a large constant fraction of the nodes never receive x∗ and thus end up deciding on some other
value x′ < x∗ instead—a violation of almost-everywhere agreement.
Theorem 3. Consider the late adversary that can block up to ǫn nodes in each round, for ǫ ≤ 110 , and suppose
that nodes start with input values chosen by the adversary. Then, for any positive constant δ < 1, there is an
algorithm that achieves consensus among (1− ǫδ )n nodes inO(log n) rounds with high probability, while sending
O(n log n) messages in total.
We first recall some concentration bounds.
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Algorithm 1Multi-value consensus against a late adversary
1: Every node u initalizes xu with its input value and, with probability
c1 logn
n , joins the active nodes; otherwise
it marks itself inactive. // Note that c1, c2, c3 > 0 are constants.
2: Each active node u sends xu to a set of ⌈c2 logn⌉ uniformly at random chosen nodes.
3: Every inactive or blocked node v sets xv = ⊥; (we define ⊥ ≤ x for all values x).
4: for t = 1, . . . , ⌈c3 logn⌉ iterations do
5: for every node v do
6: v updates xv = max(R ∪ {xv}), where R is the set of newly received values.
7: if xv 6= ⊥ then v joins active nodes.
8: if t < c3 logn and v is active then
9: Node v sends xv to 2 unif. at random chosen nodes.
10: Every node u decides on xu and terminates.
Definition 3 (Martingale [33]). A sequence of random variables Z0, Z1, . . . is a martingale with respect to the
sequenceX0, X1, . . . if, for all t ≥ 0, the following conditions hold:
1. Zt is a function ofX0, . . . , Xt.
2. E[Zt] <∞.
3. E[Zt+1 | X0, . . . , Xt] = Zt.
Definition 4 (Lipschitz Condition [33]). Let f(X1, . . . , Xn) be a function to the reals. We say that f satisfies the
Lipschitz condition with bound c if, for any set of values x1, . . . , xn and yi,
|f(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− f(x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+i, . . . , xn)| ≤ c.
Theorem 4 (Azuma-Hoeffding Inequality [33]). Let X0, . . . , be a martingale sequence such that for each k,
|Xk −Xk−1| ≤ ck. Then, for all t ≥ 0 and all λ > 0,
Pr [|Xt −X0| ≥ λ] ≤ 2 exp
(
− λ
2
2
∑t
k=1 c
2
k
)
.
Proof of Theorem 3. Since the late adversary can block a constant fraction of nodes, we cannot rely on existing
results on information spreading to show almost-everywhere agreement. For round t, let Bt be the set of blocked
nodes and define A to be the set of active nodes in round 1. Let x∗ be the maximum value of all input values of
nodes in A \B1 and let S0 ⊆ A \B1 be the set of non-blocked active nodes3 starting with x∗.
For rounds t ≥ 1, we define St to be the set of nodes whose value is x∗ at the end of round t and define
σt = |St|. The following two lemmas show that σt grows by a constant factor until it reaches a size of Ω(n).
Lemma 12. σ1 ≥ Ω(log n).
Proof. By description of the algorithm, the expected number of active nodes is≥ c1 logn and, since the adversary
is oblivious to the current coin flips of the nodes, the probability of blocking an active node is at most ǫ, resulting
in at most ǫ · c1 logn blocked active nodes in round 1 in expectation. As nodes become active independently, a
standard Chernoff bound ensures that, w.h.p.,
|A \B1| ≥ 12 (1− ǫ) c1 logn = Ω(log n).
Since x∗ is defined as the maximum of the input values in A \ B1, at least c1 logn randomly chosen peers are
contacted by at least one active non-blocked node in A \B1 that has x∗ as its input value. Similarly to above, we
use a Chernoff bound to argue that at least 12 (1 − ǫ)c1 logn of the contacted peers are non-blocked in the current
round and hence adopt x∗, thus proving σ1 = Ω(logn).
Lemma 13. Let r = r(t) = σt−1n and let ρ < 1 be a positive constant determined in the proof. There is a constant
α > 0 such that, for any t where r < ρ, we have σt ≥ max {(1 + α)σt−1,Θ(logn)} .
3Recall that the nodes that the adversary blocks are affected after they have performed their local computation.
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Proof. We proceed by induction over t. To simplify our analysis, we assume that after having sent it to 2 randomly
chosen peers, active nodes “forget” their current value and adopt value⊥. Clearly, this assumption can only worsen
the runtime of the algorithm. In other words, σt only accounts for nodes that have received a message with x
∗ in
round t.
The base case t = 1 follows from Lemma 12. Now consider any round t > 1. By the inductive hypothesis,
St−1 (i.e. the set of nodes currently holding x
∗) contains at least max {(1 + α)σt−2,Θ(logn)} nodes unknown
to the adversary. Let U ⊆ St−1 be the subset of non-blocked nodes in round t that hold x∗ and let
β = 78 (1− ǫ). (1)
Since σt−1 = |St−1| ≥ c1 logn for a sufficiently large constant c1 > 0 (see Lemma 12), we can apply a standard
Chernoff bound to show that |U | ≥ β · σt−1 with high probability. Letm = 2|U | denote the number of messages
sent by nodes in U . Since ǫ < 12 , the eventM , which we define as
m ≥ (1 + β)σt−1, (2)
happens with high probability.
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider each of them messages as a ball and the possible destinations of
these messages as bins. LetXi be the indicator random variable that the i-th bin is hit by at least 1 ball. From (2)
and the fact that r = σt−1n , we get
Pr[Xi=1 |M ] = 1−
(
1− 1n
)m ≥ 1− e−(1+β)r. (3)
Consider the functions f(r) = 1 − e−(1+β)r and g(r) =
(
1 + β10
)
r, and their respective derivatives f ′(r) =
(1 + β)e−(1+β)r and g′(r) = 1 + β10 . Let
ρ = log
(
1 + β
1 + β/10
)
/(1 + β) > 15 ≥ 2ǫ, (4)
where we have used the assumption that ǫ ≤ 110 and (1). Since f(0) = g(0) and f ′(r) > g′(r) for all r ∈ [0, ρ],
we know that f is bounded from below by g. It follows from (3) that Pr [Xi=1 |M ] ≥
(
1 + β10
)
r. By definition,
σt =
∑n
i=1Xi, hence
E[σt |M ] ≥
(
1 + β10
)
σt−1. (5)
As the random variables Xi are not independent, we cannot apply a simple Chernoff Bound argument to obtain
a high concentration bound. Instead, we will set up a martingale and use the method of bounded differences (cf.
Chap 12 in [33]). Let Yi be the bin chosen by the i-th ball and let Z = h(Y1, . . . , Yn) be the number of nonempty
bins. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define Zi = E[h(Y1, . . . , Yn) | Y1, . . . , Yi,M ], and let Z0 = E[h(Y1, . . . , Yn) |M ]. To
see that the sequence Z0, Z1, . . . , Zn is a martingale (cf. Def. 3), note that, by definition of Zi, we have
E [Zi | Y1, . . . , Yi−1,M ] = E [ E [Z | Y1, . . . , Yi,M ] | Y1, . . . , Yi−1,M ] = E [Z | Y1, . . . , Yi−1,M ] = Zi−1.
As changing the destination of any ball can affect the number of nonempty bins by at most 1, we know that the
function h satisfies the Lipschitz condition (see Def. 4) with bound 1. Thus we can apply the Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality (see Theorem 4) with parameter λ =
√
c′ σt−1 logn, for a sufficiently large constant c
′ > 0, to derive
that
Pr
[
σt ≤
(
1 + β20
)
σt−1 |M
]
≤ Pr
[
σt ≤
(
1 + β10
)
σt−1 − λ |M
]
≤ Pr [σt ≤ E[σt |M ]− λ |M ] (by (5))
≤ 2 exp
(
−c
′ σt−1 logn
2m
)
, (by Theorem 4)
which is n−Ω(1) because of (2). Recalling that event M happens w.h.p., we can remove the conditioning and
conclude that
Pr
[
σt≥
(
1 + β20
)
σt−1
]
≥ Pr
[
σt≥
(
1 + β20
)
σt−1 |M
]
· Pr [M ] ≥ 1− n−Ω(1).
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Consider iterations t = 1, . . . ,Θ(logn) of the algorithm. As long as r ≤ ρ, Lemma 13 tells us that the current
set of nodes that are adopting x∗ keeps growing by a constant factor with high probability in each iteration. We
can guarantee that this happens (w.h.p.) by taking a union bound over theΘ(logn) iterations of the algorithm until
r > ρ. In the following lemma, we handle the “last mile” of spreading value x∗ to (almost) all of the remaining
< (1− ρ)n nodes.
Lemma 14. Let t1 be a round where r =
σt1
n > ρ. Then, after additional Θ(logn) iterations of the algorithm,
all except at most (1 − ǫδ )n nodes adopt value x∗ with high probability, where δ is any constant < 1. This holds
even if the adversary is strongly adaptive.
Proof. Once the number of nodes that adopted x∗ is already ρn > ǫn, we do not need to make use of the lateness
of the adversary in the proof; in fact, we assume that the adversary is strongly adaptive. Conditioned on eventM
and assuming that the adversary blocks up to ǫn nodes, we know from (2) that the number of messages carrying
x∗ is at least
(1 + β)ρn− 2ǫn ≥ βǫn = Ω(n),
where we have used the fact that ρ ≥ 2ǫ (cf. (4)). LetXi,t = 1 if and only if bin i is nonempty at the end of round
t and let Bi,t be the indicator random variable that node i is blocked by the late adversary in round t. Clearly, for
any t ≥ t1,
Pr[Xi,t=1 | Bi,t=0,M,Xi,t−1=0] ≥ 1−
(
1− 1
n
)2βǫn
≥ 1− e−2βǫ, (6)
which is a constant. Since the adversary can block at most ǫ · c4 · n logn nodes in total during c4 logn rounds,
a simple counting argument tells us that, for any δ < 1, at least (1 − ǫδ )n nodes are unblocked during at least
(1− δ)c4 logn rounds. By choosing c4 to be a sufficiently large constant depending on ǫ, α, and δ, it follows from
(6) that the probability of bin i remaining empty in all of the next c4 logn iterations is at most n
−Ω(1). Finally, we
can take a union bound over the O(n) empty bins to show that at least (1 − ǫδ )n nodes adopt the value x∗ with
high probability after the nextΘ(logn) iterations.
From Lemma 14 it follows that value x∗ reaches all but a small constant fraction of the nodes. Since x∗ is the
maximum value in the network after round 1 (cf. Line 3), the algorithm satisfies almost-everywhere agreement
and the validity property as claimed, thus completing the proof of Theorem 3.
4 A Time Lower Bound for Agreement with Limited Communication
We now study the impact of limited communication on the ability of nodes to solve almost everywhere consensus.
In particular, we use the time-tested method of indistinguishable executions to provide a trade-off between the
amount of communication available and the time required for termination correctly. We point out that these
results hold even if the adversary does not block any nodes. Consequently, this means that increasing the lateness
of the adversary cannot improve the time complexity bounds of solving almost-everywhere consensus.
Theorem 5. Suppose that each node can send a message to up to d nodes in each round. There is no randomized
Monte Carlo algorithm that achieves almost-everywhere consensus with probability at least 1 − O( 1n ) among
> (1− ǫ′)n nodes and terminates in o(logd n) rounds, where 0 < ǫ′ < 12 . This holds even if no nodes are blocked
by the adversary and each node has a unique identifier known to all other nodes.
Before proving Theorem 5, we consider its impact on the complexity bounds of our algorithms. Since the
majority-rule algorithm presented in Section 2 has d = O(1), its time complexity bound is optimal. For the
maximum propagation algorithm in Section 3 we have d = O(log n), thus applying Theorem 5 tells us that the
bound is optimal up to a factor of O(log logn).
The overall structure of our proof follows the classical results of [20, 18] and a more recent generalization of
these techniques to the asynchronous setting presented in [7], with the important difference that here we consider
almost everywhere agreement instead of consensus. We first introduce some technical machinery. We recall that
an execution of an algorithm is a sequence of rounds that is fully determined by the input value assignment of
the nodes and n (infinite) bit strings representing the nodes’ private sources of randomness. We use the notation
α
P∼ α′ to say that executions α and α′ are indistinguishable for a set of nodes P , which means that each u ∈ P
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goes through the same sequence of local state transitions in both executions. Intuitively speaking, this means that
node u cannot tell the difference between α and α′. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that u observes
the same sequence of random bits and messages in both executions, and starts with the same input value. We
define an indistinguishability chain as a sequence of executions (α1, α2, . . . ), where there are nonempty sets of
nodes P1, P2, . . . such that, for all i, it holds that αi
Pi∼ αi+1. We refer the reader to Chapter 5 in [8] for a more
complete definition.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that there is an algorithm A
that terminates in t = o(logd n) rounds and achieves almost-everywhere consensus among all except< ǫ
′n nodes
with high probability. For parameter
k =
(1− ǫ′)n
dt
, (7)
we consider a partitioning of the set V of n nodes into {S1, . . . , S⌈n/k⌉} such that |Si| ≤ k. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n/k,
we consider an execution αi and assign the nodes in
⋃i
j=1 Sj input value 1, where we follow the convention that⋃0
j=1 Sj = ∅. All other nodes start with input value 0 in α. This ensures that all nodes start with 0 in α0 whereas
all nodes start with 1 in α⌈n/k⌉. We will now show that (α0, . . . , α⌈n/k⌉) forms an indistinguishability chain with
respect to large sets of nodes.
Lemma 15. Suppose that each node is equipped with the same random bits in every αi. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ ⌈n/k⌉,
there exists a set Pi of size ≥ ǫ′n, such that αi Pi∼ αi+1 during the first t = o(logd n) rounds of the algorithm.
Proof. Consider any i. We observe that the only difference between the initial configurations of αi and αi+1 are
the input values for nodes in Si+1, and this distinction is known to |Si+1| ≤ k distinct nodes initially. Since each
node can communicate with at most d other nodes in each round, (7) tells us that the total number of nodes that
can be causally influenced (cf. [31]) by any node in Si+1 is at most kd
t ≤ (1 − ǫ′)n during the first t rounds of
the algorithm. Thus, there exists a set Pi of at least ǫ
′n nodes for which αi and αi+1 are indistinguishable.
In the remainder of the proof, we use Lemma 15 and adapt the arguments of [7]. Let F be the event that
algorithm A fails by violating almost-everywhere agreement in at least one αi in the chain. Note that this is the
case when two sets of nodes of size ≥ ǫ′n decide on conflicting values in αi.
A crucial consequence of Lemma 15 is that, for each pair αi and αi+1, there is a large set of ≥ ǫ′n nodes that
decide on the same value in both executions. By the validity property, we know that the decision is 0 in α0 and
1 in α⌈n/k⌉. Therefore, considering that A is a Monte Carlo algorithm that is guaranteed to terminate within t
rounds, we have Pr[F ] = 1.
Recall that we have assumed in contradiction that algorithm A succeeds with probability at least 1 − O( 1n )
and hence, almost-everywhere agreement can be violated with probability O( 1n ) in any individual execution. By
taking a union bound over the ⌈nk ⌉+ 1 executions in the chain, we get
1 = Pr[F ] ≤
(⌈n
k
⌉
+ 1
)
O
(
1
n
)
= O
(
dt
(1− ǫ′)n
)
+O
(
1
n
)
= o(1),
where we have used the bound (7) and where the final equality follows from the premise t = o(logd n). This is a
contradiction and completes the proof of Theorem 5.
5 ATime Lower Bound for Agreement under the Strongly Adaptive Block-
ing Adversary
It is also possible to consider the strongly adaptive blocking adversary, who observes the entire state of the
current round including the coin flips performed by nodes, before choosing a set of ≤ ǫn nodes that are blocked
from sending/receiving communication during the round (cf. Section 1.4).4 Since this adversary can simulate the
strongly adaptive crash-failure adversary, it is easy to see that the Ω˜(
√
n) lower bounds shown for the latter in [12]
also holds for the strongly adaptive blocking adversary.
4We follow the notation of [2], where the adversary that observes the current coin flips and network configuration before making its choice
for the next round is called strongly adaptive.
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However, by fully exploiting the adversary’s power of adaptively blocking a possibly changing set of nodes,
we can strengthen this result toΩ(n) rounds in Theorem 6. To this end, we adapt the lower bound proof of [6], who
show a lower bound of Ω(n2) on the step complexity of reaching consensus in the asynchronous shared memory
model under a strongly adaptive crash-failure adversary. We point out that in Footnote 1 of [6], the authors already
observed that their lower bound construction for the asynchronous crash-failure model can also be applied to the
synchronous model with mobile failures, which corresponds to our setting of having a blocking adversary:
“Hiding processes in a layer can be described as a round-based model with mobile failures, where
a process that fails in a certain round may still take steps in further rounds [Santoro and Widmayer
1989]. The equivalence between this model and the asynchronous model is discussed by Raynal and
Roy [2005].”5
In the remainder of this section, we guide the reader through the modified lower bound proof and how to apply it
to the strongly adaptive blocking adversary.
Note that here we are considering binary almost-everywhere agreement rather than binary consensus and hence
we need to adapt the notion of a v-deciding adversary of [6], for consensus input value v ∈ {0, 1}. We define a
configuration in round r to be a tuple C = (C(u1), . . . , C(un)), where C(ui) denotes the local state of node ui
at the beginning of the round, before performing its local computation and coin flips for round r. The probability
distribution from which a node ui samples its random bits depends on its local configuration C(ui), and hence
we denote the product probability space of the local random bits of the nodes with respect to a configuration C
by XC . We say that an adversary who can block f = ǫn nodes is v-deciding from configuration C in round
r if the probability to reach almost-everywhere agreement on value v is more than 1 − ǫr, where we define
ǫr =
1
n3/2
− r(n−f)3 , similarly to Section 3 in [6]. Note that the probability is computed with respect to the coin
flips drawn fromXC in configuration C.
We say that a configurationC is v-potent with respect to a set of adversariesA, if there is an adversary in the
setA that is v deciding fromC (c.f. [34]). We define a configurationC to be v-valent with respect toA (or simply
univalent) if C is v-potent but not (1 − v)-potent. Configuration C is bivalent if it is both 0-valent and 1-valent.
On the other hand, if C is neither 0-valent nor 1-valent, we say that C is null-valent, and we call C non-univalent
if it is either bivalent or null-valent.
The proof of [6] constructs a sequence of undecided configurations. First they show (c.f. Lemma 4.1 in [6])
that there is an initial input assignment of the nodes that results in a non-univalent initial configuration, which
requires at most one node to fail by crashing. In our setting, this requires the adversary to permanently block at
most one node.
Then, in the inductive step several cases are distinguished, assuming that the algorithm has reached an unde-
cided configuration. To this end, a given configuration is extended by a layer, which is a collection of steps by a
subset S of the nodes (at most 1 step per each node in S). We can translate such a layer from the shared memory
model to a synchronous round in our message passing model by instructing the adversary to block nodes that do
not take steps in the layer.
1. If the current configuration C is null-valent, it is shown that with probability ≥ 1 −O(1/n3), it is possible
to extend C by a layer that results in another null-valent configuration. (Note that in our setting, a layer
simply corresponds to a single round of the algorithm.) This can be achieved by constructing a layer that
does not contain a specific set B of O(
√
n logn) nodes (and hence these nodes do not take steps), which is
admissible in the asynchronousmodel. In our synchronousmessage passing model, we can achieve the same
effect by instructing the adversary to block the nodes in B during the current round. A crucial difference
to the crash failure adversary of [12] is that our adversary does not necessarily need to block the nodes in
B during future rounds and hence extending a null-valent configuration does not reduce the total amount of
nodes that the adversary can block in future rounds. Similarly, [6] achieve the same effect by leveraging the
asynchrony of the scheduler to prevent nodes from taking a step in a given layer.
2. If the current configuration C is bivalent, Lemma 4.3 in [6] shows that, by just failing at most 1 additional
node u, it is possible to extend C to a configuration that is either bivalent, null-valent, or a so called v-
switching configuration, which is a v-valent configuration that is reached by extending a (1 − v)-potent
configurationC with a (1− v)-deciding adversary whose strategy depends on the sampled coin flips. In our
setting, we can achieve the same effect by permanently blocking u.
3. Finally, in the case where a (1 − v)-potent configuration C was extended to a configuration C′ that is a
v-switching configuration, Lemma 4.4 of [6] shows that with probability 1 − O(1/n3/2), it is sufficient to
5The references mentioned are listed as [40] and [39] in our bibliography.
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crash at most one additional node to extend C′ to a configuration that is a (1 − v)-switching configuration
or non-univalent. As in the previous case, we can emulate the adversary’s strategy by permanently blocking
one additional node.
The detailed proof of Theorem 6 follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.8 in [6], where the above
inductive argument is used to obtain a sequence of Ω(n) layers (with probability 1− o(1)) in which the algorithm
remains undecided. This corresponds to a sequence of Ω(n) rounds in our setting. (As mentioned above, [6]
already point out the possibility of applying their construction to the synchronous model with “mobile” failures,
which is due to the equivalence of this model with the asynchronous crash-failure model argued in [39]. Since our
construction does not require new techniques, we omit the formal details of the proof.)
Theorem 6. Reaching binary almost-everywhere agreement among more than half of the nodes requires at least
Ω(n) rounds with probability 1 − o(1) against the strongly adaptive adversary, who observes the entire state of
the network including coin flips performed by the nodes, if, in each round, the adversary can block a set of up to
ǫn nodes, for some constant ǫ > 0.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We have performed simulations of the (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm for various network sizes and adversarial thresh-
olds. As elaborated in more detail below, these results suggest that the algorithm reaches almost-everywhere
agreement within ≤ 2 log(n) rounds (on average) while being resilient against up to n/15 adversarial attacks per
round. Moreover, by just increasing the communication degree of each node from 6 to 12, i.e., executing the
(12, 3)-majority algorithm, it turns out that agreement is achievable as long as the adversary blocks no more than
n/5 nodes per round.
6.1 Setup
The simulation was executed in the Erlang virtual machine and implemented in the programming language Elixir.
We briefly describe how to simulate the round structure in this setting.6 Each simulated node is executed as a
separate (distributed) process that communicates with the other processes via message passing. The late adversary
is also modeled as a separately executing process who is informed by all participating nodes regarding their value
at the start of the round, and then, at the end of the round, decides which nodes to block in the next round based
on this information. In more detail, the adversary computes the current difference between nodes that held a 0
respectively a 1 (at the start of the round). Then, the adversary sends a blocking respectively unblocking
command (as a message) to each node, which informs a node about its status in the next round. We point out that,
according to the (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm (see Section 2), any node u that is blocked discards its current value
and adopts value ⊥ instead. Moreover, node u refrains from sending messages to other nodes during the next
round and discards all received messages. The execution starts in a balanced state w.r.t. the input values and is
terminated if one of the following two conditions hold:
(1) the difference between the number of nodes supporting 0 and the number of nodes supporting 1 is ≥ (23 −
ǫ)n;
(2) at least n/2 nodes currently hold the reset value⊥.
Case (1) represents reaching almost-everywhere agreement, whereas we assume that the adversary has succeeded
if Case (2) holds and consider the trial as failed.
6.2 Results
For each parameter setting, we performed 1000 independent runs of the (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm. The first set of
results concern the (6, 3)-majority algorithm and show that the algorithm succeeded to achieve almost-everywhere
agreement in 100% of the trials as long as ǫ ≤ 1/15, i.e., when the adversary can block at most n/15 nodes in
each round; see Figure 1. The average number of rounds until termination is within 2 log(n) rounds, whereas
the 95th percentile is bounded by 3 log(n). For ǫ ≥ 1/14, on the other hand, the success rate of the algorithm
drops to approximately 80% and the 95th percentiles increase significantly. Since the algorithm fails when too
many nodes hold the reset value ⊥, which either occurs due to being blocked by the adversary or when a node
6We emphasize that the goal of the simulation is to evaluate the theoretical bounds of the (k, ℓ)-majority algorithm. In particular, we did
not aim for an efficient real-world implementation of consensus.
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Figure 1: Running time of the (6, 3)-Majority Algorithm when the adversary can block ǫn nodes, for ǫ ∈ { 1
17
, 1
16
, 1
15
, 1
14
}.
The filled bars represent the average number of rounds and the error-bars show the 95th percentiles of the 1000 trials for each
parameter setting. Note that the algorithm succeeded in all trials for ǫ ∈ { 1
17
, 1
16
, 1
15
}. For the case ǫ = 1
14
(shown as the
grey bar), the success rate was reduced to 81% for n = 4096, whereas the running time increased for smaller n; the (clipped)
95th-percentiles for n = {512, 1024} and ǫ = 1/14 are at 27 and 22 rounds, respectively. Almost all trials failed for larger
values of ǫ.
does not receive sufficiently many messages from other nodes, we also investigated the impact of increasing the
number of recipients that each node contacts to disseminate its value from 6 to 12. Figure 2 shows that the (12, 3)-
majority algorithm has a significantly higher resilience and achieved a.e. agreement in all trials for ǫ ≤ 1/5. It
may be tempting to further increase the communication by instructing nodes to contact 24 peers in each round,
however, in our simulations this did not provide any improvements regarding the resilience threshold compared to
the (12, 3)-majority algorithm.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have initiated the study of reaching agreement in the late adversarial model, where the adversary has a view
that is outdated by 1 round. Our results raise the question if increasing the “lateness” of the adversary to a larger
number of rounds results in improvement of the time complexity of our algorithms. Our lower bound gives a
negative answer to this question. It would be interesting to investigate the impact of lateness on the complexity of
distributed algorithms also for other problems, since it is realistic to assume that typically an adversary will not
have the most up-to-date information about a distributed system.
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